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light as that between the 1982 battle for
the Falklands/Malvinas and the Cold
War, or that between the U.S. Navy’s
contribution to Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and
the global war on terror. Their analogies sometimes appear forced and their
syntheses sometimes, well, stretched.
But far more important is the expansion in thinking that this book is sure
to engender. For all the debates with
the editors and authors that will arise in
readers’ minds as they turn the pages,
previously unthought-of concepts and
insights are bound to emerge as well.
Peripheral naval campaigns can win
a war or waste valuable resources in
profitless undertakings. This book
explains how and why this has happened, and it yields insights for future
planning. No serious reader who actively
engages with the arguments that the
editors present and the examples that
they provide will finish this provocative book without a greatly enlarged
understanding of the past, present, and
potential uses and limitations of naval
power. As we enter a new era of military
and naval operations, that understanding can empower us indeed, especially
the policy makers, staff officers, and
analysts who support those operations.
This, of course, is not the first time that
Professors Elleman and Paine have done
something like this. This book follows at
least two similar earlier efforts, a volume
on naval blockades and sea power and
one on naval coalition warfare. Like
those compendiums, Naval Power and
Expeditionary Warfare seeks to get its
arms around a topic vital for naval policy
and strategy today by looking to the past
for data and concepts. Like those earlier
volumes, it definitely succeeds. All in
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all, this is an important book for naval
historians, strategists, and operators to
engage with, learn from, and ponder.
Peter M. Swartz

CNA Strategic Studies, Alexandria, Virginia

Koistinen, Paul A. C. State of War: The Political
Economy of American Warfare 1945–2011. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2012. 313pp. $39.95

The last volume of Paul Koistinen’s fivevolume study of the political economy
of American warfare from the nation’s
colonial period of the seventeenth
century to the present day, this new
book analyzes U.S. foreign policy and
national defense from the end of World
War II to the present. In it Koistinen
studies the decisions and actions that led
to the development of the current U.S.
national security system and what was
termed by Dwight D. Eisenhower the
“military-industrial complex” (MIC).
This study includes a comprehensive
historical examination of the relationships among American political,
economic, and military institutions and
of the combined effects of U.S. policy
decisions. It is an assessment of the actions and decisions made by important
institutions in the U.S. national-security
establishment. Koistinen devotes a
chapter each to the presidency, Congress, the military, the defense industry,
the scientific community, and think
tanks in a consistently organized and
chronological assessment of key foreign
and domestic events, government policies, and institutional actions. The last
two chapters synthesize government
actions and policies, with their resulting impacts on the national economy.
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In his farewell address to the nation
in January 1961, Eisenhower advised government to “guard against
the unwarranted influences, whether
sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex.” Koistinen analyzes
Ike’s caution and considers the evolution and development of the MIC.
Koistinen does not argue that the MIC
created itself or was constructed with
intent in some coordinated or collaborative effort led by the government. He,
however, does state that U.S. foreign
policy and national security requirements led to its development and that
the MIC’s pervasive influence in government, economics, and society is the result of numerous mutual and supporting
interests of government and nongovernment institutions and organizations.
The author evaluates what he describes
as the “noncompetitive” defense industry as an economic sector within the
U.S. domestic economy, considering
fundamental economic principles. This
government-constructed defense sector
operates free of the market pressures of
supply and demand; prices, accordingly,
result from the contracting processes between the military services and contractors. The conditions of the defense sector rarely stimulate competition, owing
to numerous mergers among a decreasing number of defense corporations.
Today, the U.S. defense budget remains large, yet insufficient to meet
the requirements placed on the military. Koistinen observes that the MIC
continues to produce high-technology
weapons at high cost. The cost of these
weapons results in smaller quantities,
a fact that results in a force structure
that is insufficient to meet the requirements of the national strategy.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss4/13

The author concludes that over time the
MIC has become so entrenched in the
economic, political, and social lives of
the nation that today it is nearly impossible to diminish its influence. This book
presents a compelling explanation of the
effects on the U.S. economy of government and private-sector actions of recent
decades regarding the development of
the current national-security system.
Sean Sullivan

Naval War College

Bell, Christopher M. Churchill and Seapower.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013. 429pp.
$34.95

Although Winston Churchill is still regarded as one of the great British leaders
of the twentieth century, he continues to
attract not only praise but a large measure of criticism. This book is a valuable
addition to a formidable library of such
analysis. As its title tells us, this is a
review of Churchill’s thinking about sea
power in general and British sea power
in particular. Its central theme is nicely
encapsulated by a famous remark made
about Churchill by General Sir Alan
Brooke, arguably one of Britain’s most
famous and successful soldiers during
the Second World War: “A complete
amateur of strategy, he swamps himself
in detail he should never look at and
as a result fails ever to see a strategic
problem in its true perspective.”
However, Christopher Bell asks, is this
kind of criticism, from a number of
scholars, any more justified than the
uncritical adulation Churchill usually receives? Where does the truth
lie in this spectrum of possible reactions to Churchill as naval strategist?
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